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BOOK REVIEWS 
Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the metaphysics of Human Persons, edited 
by Kevin Corcoran. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. 252. $49.95 
(cloth), $21.95 (paper). 
VICTOR REPPERT, Glendale Community College 
In the inaugural volume of Faith and Philosophy Alvin Plantinga wrote 
what I like to call the Declaration of Independence for Christian philoso-
phers, the famous /I Advice to Christian Philosophers." In that essay 
Plantinga maintained that Christian philosophers should not allow what 
seems plausible to the philosophical community at large to determine how 
one goes about reflecting on philosophical issues. Thinking through ques-
tions in ethics, or metaphysics, or epistemology, one can and should tackle 
those issues using what we believe to be true as Christians, without having 
to justify those Christian perspectives to the wider philosophical community. 
I believe that there are few fields in philosophy where Plantinga's 
advice is more needed than in contemporary philosophy of mind. If you 
look at what might be regarded as "mainstream" philosophy of mind, as 
represented by books in the MIT IBradford series, you find three assump-
tionsmade: 
1. Cartesian Dualism is a dismissible position; so implausible that 
one hardly needs an argument to reject it. 
2. The only alternative to Cartesian Dualism is some version of phys-
icalism. 
3. Theistic metaphysics is irrelevant to reflection in the philosophy of 
mind. In assessing the plausibility of a position, one must do so 
from the point of view of atheistic philosophical naturalism. 
Soul, Body, and Survival, edited by Kevin Corcoran, calls all of these 
assumptions into question. The first section of the book is devoted to the 
merits and demerits of Cartesian dualism. The second is devoted to alter-
natives to Cartesianism that fall outside the normal range of materialist 
positions. The third is devoted to the question of whether a materialist the-
ory of mind is compatible with Christian doctrines of the future life. 
The very first essay in the book is a defense of Cartesian Dualism, by 
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John Foster. For Foster, Cartesianism is committed to three claims: 
1. The mental is sui generis, existing independently of the physical 
and not in any way reducible to it. 
2. Mental states inhere is a thinking thing or substance, not in a bun-
dle. 
3. Mental states do not have locations in space. 
Perhaps a fourth position might be added to the set of the positions on 
dualism, namely 
4. Souls are created individually by God ex nihilo; they do not emerge 
from pre-existing material states. 
Indeed, Foster adverts to God's creative activity in response to the claim 
that physical nature does not seem to have the resources to produce non-
physical objects. 
Jaegwon Kim's essay "Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism" 
comes from a philosopher who operates out of the physicalist tradition. 
Unlike some in that tradition, however, he has been very serious about 
pressing difficulties for otherwise popular forms of physicalism in the area 
of mental causation. In this paper he presents some problems for dualism 
in the area of mental causation. He reconsiders the familiar objection to 
Descartes' dualism that dualism is untenable because we cannot see how 
something nonphysical can interact with something physical. As Kim 
points out, this is often presented with no or almost no supporting argu-
mentation. However, Kim does supply some argumentation to put some 
meat on the bones of the familiar objection, by generating what he calls the 
pairing problem. 
Kim maintains that a spatial framework is necessary for the existence of 
a causal relationship amongst objects. If two rifles are fired and two people 
are killed, what criteria would lead us to correctly pair the causes and 
effects? The answer, says Kim, is the spatial relationships between deadly 
bullets and the victims. Kim also points out that lack of a spatial relation 
between a suspect and the victim is often sufficient to ground an alibi in a 
murder case. But since souls are not spatial, spatial pairing relationships 
between souls and matter cannot exist. Kim considers the possibility that 
souls have spatial locations, but he finds some difficulties with that idea as 
well, but he thinks this is problematic as well. We need to locate souls at a 
particular point in space, and claims that it would beg the question to 
locate the souls in the brain. Second, he argues that to locate souls in space 
would require that not more than one soul could occupy a location in 
space, that is, something like the impenetrability of matter would have to 
obtain. But he asks, if this is so, "why aren't such souls just material objects, 
albeit of a very special, and strange kind?" And he thinks the soul found 
in a geometrical point could not have a structure capable of accounting for 
the rich mental life that humans have. Finally, he is suspicious of any solu-
tions to the problem dictated by "dualist commitments." He says "We 
shouldn't do philosophy by first deciding what conclusions we want to 
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prove, and then posit convenient entities and premises to get us where we 
want to go." 
First of all, it needs to be made clear just what it is for something to be a 
material thing. The book makes it evident that the concept of "materiality" 
and "matter" need to be made clearer than they are. This is especially 
imperative for Christians who want to go as far as possible in accommodat-
ing their faith to "materialism." Orthodox materialism is a corollary of 
philosophical naturalism, and is typically committed to at least this: that the 
physical order is causally closed, and that whatever other states exist super-
vene on the physical; that is, there cannot be a difference without a physical 
difference. But what is more, physicalism is committed to the idea that the 
physical order is mechanistic, that is, purposive explanations cannot be 
basic-level explanations at the physical level. If the material is defined in 
this way, then it seems to me that something could have a spatial location, 
and it could also possess impenetrability, and still not be material in the 
orthodox sense. It could still be the case that the mental is sui generis and 
fundamental, and one of Foster's dualist theses would still be true. 
Timothy O'Connor's essay is a defense of just this claim. Although he 
rejects Cartesianism because it fails to provide a metaphysics that makes 
the body and soul constitute a unified system, he nonetheless thinks that 
the mind can have not merely emergent properties, but also emergent 
causal powers. In particular, the power to perform actions that are free in 
the libertarian sense is possible even though there are no separate individ-
uals, either in space or not in space, which perform these free actions. But 
of course this is going to make them causally independent of the physical 
order and sufficiently free from the nexus of non-mental causation to have 
libertarian free will. For if we accept the orthodox physicalist position that 
the physical is closed, the physical is mechanistic, and mental states super-
vene on the physical, then all mental states, including human choices, are 
determined by an essentially non-mental physical world. If libertarianism 
is true, then the fact of choice cannot be explained in terms of a physical 
substratum that makes no choices. To accept libertarian free will while 
retaining a physicalist ontology requires attributing to matter powers and 
liabilities when it is part of a mind that it lacks when it is, say, part of a 
rock. And from the point of view of materialist orthodoxy, this is simply 
not acceptable. Of course, it should be pointed out that O'Connor is not 
attempting to stay within the framework of orthodox materialism. 
Taliaferro's essay, "Emergentism and Consciousness," is a Cartesian 
response to Colin McGinn's The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a 
Material World. McGinn is one of a substantial number of philosophers who 
see a serious difficulty in understanding how minds could exist in a mater-
ial world, who avoids the tendency to eliminate or functionalize the mind, 
but who nonetheless resist the temptation to accept any form of substance 
dualism. In particular, McGinn thinks that no solution to the problems 
that arise from a materialist perspective can be alleviated by accepting a 
dualism backed up by a wider theistic metaphysics. If there are problems 
with materialism, the cure (dualism backed by theism) is worse than the 
disease. McGinn's objections, and objections like them, are in my view the 
main reason why many philosophers think that while materialism may 
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have a lot of problems, but nevertheless it won't do to resolve these prob-
lems with a change of metaphysics, either by adopting dualism or by 
adopting theism. 
McGinn maintains this for four reasons. 1) Dualism leaves us with an 
exaggerated picture of the mind-body relation. 2) Dualism leads to epiphe-
nomenalism. Matter determines what happens in the world, so if you have 
a soul, it has nothing to do with what you do. Your body could do all the 
same things it does in a dualist world if you were a zombie, with no con-
scious mind, 3) If the mind is not physical then there could be ghosts, that 
is, disembodied persons. But there cannot be disembodies persons, so 
dualism cannot be true. 4) If dualism is true, then the soul would have to 
have arisen in the course of biological evolution. But biological evolution 
works with physical states and cannot produce a soul, so dualism is false. 
Finally, McGinn argues that if the existence of the mind is a mystery, intro-
ducing the mind of God to explain the mystery only makes the mystery 
worse. We are better off attributing such mysteries to the limitations of our 
understanding, than to resolve them by appealing to a supernatural being. 
In response, Taliaferro says that 1) Cartesianism does not require a radi-
cal separation of mind and body, there can be extensive dependence and 
interaction between mind and body on the Cartesian view, and later he 
suggests that this is what you should expect if theism is true. 2) McGinn 
assumes that, necessarily, the same physiological state will issue in the 
same behavior, but why assume that all causal relations are necessary? To 
this I would have added that if dualism is true, and there is interaction 
between the mind and the body, then the physical order can be expected to 
run differently than it would if there were no minds interacting with the 
body. Epiphenomenalism is a consequence of dualism only if one assumes 
the principle of the causal closure of the physical, a highly question-beg-
ging doctrine to assume in a debate with a Cartesian! 3) Is the idea of dis-
embodied existence coherent? Taliaferro, based on some comments by 
Galen Strawson, suggests that McGinn gratuitously assumes that the idea 
of matter is clear to us, and that consciousness is what needs to be made 
sense of. But is this an accurate picture? Our understanding of matter, as 
understood by modem physics, is far more complex and obscure than any 
conception we might have of the soul. 4) A theist does not need to presume 
that the soul resulted from biological evolution. But this brings us to 
McGinn's final point, that to bring in theism is to essentially beg the ques-
tion, bringing in a mind to explain the existence of the mind. But Taliaferro 
reminds us that theists argue from the contingency of the physical world to 
the existence of God. Contingent states of affairs require explanation; nec-
essary states of affairs may not need explanation. Also, it seems to me that 
McGinn's objection again presupposes that mind is what needs explana-
tion and that matter is self-explanatory. While nontheists may choose their 
own starting point, theists hypothesize that if there is a God, then we can 
understand human consciousness as the work of a conscious intelligent 
being. This underscores one of the volume's major themes, the relevance 
of theistic metaphysics to the philosophy of mind. 
Eric Olson's article defends the claim that if one is going to accept dual-
ism, then one ought to accept a pure dualism, according to which you are 
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your soul and you have a body, rather than accept the idea, commonly pro-
pounded, that you are a compound of body and soul. Stewart Goetz argues 
that the modal argument for dualism, offered by Swinburne, Taliaferro and 
others, begs the question against the materialist, and that if an argument for 
dualism is to be found, it is what he calls the Simple Argument, according 
to which human beings, unlike physical bodies, are simple entities. 
While the status of full-blown Cartesian dualism is certainly not as dead 
as many have supposed, nevertheless there are alternatives to 
Cartesianism which certainly contradict orthodox physicalism. One of 
these is William Hasker's Emergent Dualism, defended at much greater 
length in his book The Emergent Self/ which maintains that the mind or soul 
is a distinct substance from the body, but the mind or soul is produced by 
the human body. This is more than property emergence. A radically dif-
ferent individual is what (or rather who) is emergent. By taking this posi-
tion he seeks to avoid the philosophical problems of physicalism and the 
difficulties involved in what he takes to be the excessive cleavage between 
mind and body found in Cartesian Dualism. He seems fully aware that 
physical matter, as ordinarily understood, is not thought to have the poten-
tial to create a separate mind, and, as a result, I am inclined to suppose that 
his position is wildly implausible on atheistic assumptions. But, as Hasker 
makes explicit, he is a theist, so is it possible that God created the mind by 
giving to matter the capacity of generating it? 
Brain Leftow defends a Thomistic view of the mind that makes the per-
son a single thing that is a combination of form (the soul) and matter (the 
body). However, he does not see this as a form of dualism because 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, denies that there are any purely material 
objects: even rocks are combinations of matter and form. But we have to 
wonder if Thomas's view of the relation of the soul to the body makes 
sense unless we are prepared to accept Thomas's view of nature as a 
whole, which is in conflict with the mechanistic understanding of the phys-
ical which has dominated scientific thought for the last five centuries. 
E. J. Lowe defends the claim that the self is a simple being which must 
be different from the physical body, using a version of the Unity of 
Consciousness Argument. However, this does not necessarily lead to 
Cartesianism, because the self could be spatial. Lynne Baker's piece is also 
a defense of a position she has defended in greater detail elsewhere. Her 
view is that a person is constituted by, but not identical to, a physical 
human organism. She identifies her position as materialist, but in fact her 
first book on the philosophy of mind is entitled Saving Belief: The Case 
Against Physicalism,4 and that book is mentioned by Stephen Davis's essay 
as one reason why he rejects materialism and now accepts dualism. 
Orthodox physicalism requires that explanations in terms of mental states 
be 11 cashed out" in terms of a more fundamental physical substratum, and 
so Baker's materialism would not pass muster with materialists like 
Dennett, the Churchlands, or even more moderate, "retentive" (as opposed 
to eliminative) materialists. It seems that she does accept the first of 
Foster's dualist theses, but not the second or third. Just as when we talk 
about dualism it is evident that there is a variety of positions that fall under 
that umbrella, it is equally evident that there are hybrid positions available 
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that may be called by the name materialism but would not be considered 
orthodox by most card-carrying materialists. 
The final section concerns the issue of whether mind-body dualism is 
required in order for there to be the kind of post-mortem survival required 
by Christian doctrine. Trenton Merricks is a Christian mind-body physicalist 
who maintains that person is identical to their physical body. He addresses 
the criticism that we could not enjoy a post-mortem existence on the 
assumption that physicalism is true. He says that this claim is based on the 
idea that there are criteria of personal identity over time, but he argues that 
there are no such criteria. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that physi-
calism renders post-mortem existence impossible. Kevin Corcoran employs 
a version of the Constitution View to support post-mortem survival given 
materialism. However, John Cooper argues that, regardless of what may be 
logically possible, the biblical understanding of postmortem survival 
requires that humans be able to exist at least temporarily without their bod-
ies. And this, of course, would require some form of dualism. Stephen Davis 
argues that while postmortem survival is compatible with the doctrine of 
resurrection, he himself accepts dualism on philosophical grounds. 
As a whole, this book is a very exciting one from the point of view of 
the mind-body problem. Rather than working with the textbook alter-
natives of "Cartesian dualism" and the varieties of materialism, there 
are numerous middle positions, some of which may be difficult to even 
categorize as materialist or dualist. Perhaps a new set of categories 
should be employed: 
1. Standard materialism. In my view someone counts as a standard 
materialist if they believe that a) physics is mechanistic and to be 
described in wholly non-mental terms, b) physics is causally closed 
and c) all states that are not physical supervene on physical states. 
2. Non-standard materialism. There are no nonmaterial substances, 
but nonetheless one or more of the three essential doctrines of 
materialism is denied. 
3. Standard (Cartesian) dualism. All three of Foster's three main doc-
trines are accepted, and that the soul is not in space. 
4. Non-standard dualism. There are two substances, but the mental 
substance is in space, and may be generated by the physical body. 
I would end with one further comment. Philosophical naturalists, as I 
understand it, are pushed by the constraints of their overall metaphysics to 
conclude that Standard Materialism is true. But if there are good philo-
sophical reasons to reject Standard Materialism, (as I believe that there are), 
then some arguments from the phenomenon of mind can be developed for 
preferring a theistic world-view to a naturalistic one. Debates on these 
matters have only just begun! 
NOTES 
1. Alvin Plantinga, "Advice to Christian Philosophers," Faith and 
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Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, by Robert C. Roberts. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 357. $70.00 (Cloth), $25.00 (Paper). 
NANCY E. SNOW, Marquette University 
This book is the first part of a projected two-volume study of the emotions 
and their place in moral personality. The volume is ambitious, densely 
written, and thoroughly argued. Since Roberts' primary concern is to use 
conceptual analysis to elucidate the nature and moral import of emotions, 
in chapter one he defends conceptual analysis against critics. In chapter 
two, he develops his own theory of the nature of emotions. He applies the 
theory to many particular emotions in chapter three. Chapter four closes 
the book with an exploration of assorted topics, such as error in emotion, 
emotions and feelings, emotions and the self, true and false emotions, emo-
tions and literature, and emotional education. 
In chapter one, Roberts describes conceptual analysis as " ... particular-
ly based on collection of and reflection about examples from everyday 
human life, many of which can only be understood in the light of a fairly 
rich narrative background" (p. 5). He defends this method of understand-
ing emotions against two lines of attack, one from Amelie O. Rorty and 
another from Paul E. Griffiths (among others). The upshot of the 
labyrinthine analysis of Rorty's view is that emotion is a wide-ranging and 
complex topic. According to Roberts, a useful understanding of emotion 
should explain why some concepts, such as anger and fear, are paradigm 
cases of what English speakers regard as emotion, whereas notions like 
surprise and startle are marginal cases (see p. 14). 
An examination of the second line of criticism of conceptual analysis fol-
lows the laborious treatment of Rorty. The second criticism comes from 
those who believe that emotion should be understood in scientific terms. 
Roberts' arguments about purely scientific analyses of emotions are gen-
uinely helpful in ferreting out useful methodological approaches to a truly 
complex topic. Roberts' arguments lead him to the commonsense conclu-
sion that emotions are best studied from a variety of disciplinary angles 
(see p. 36). Though Roberts endorses conceptual analysis, he is also aware 
of its limitations (see pp. 57-9). 
In chapter two, he uses conceptual analysis to develop his own theory of 
emotions. Before turning to the substance of the view, two preliminary 
